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Abstract

Network security is of vital importance for corporations and institutions. In order to protect valuable
computer systems, network data needs to be analyzed so that possible network intrusions can be detected.
Supervised machine learning methods achieve high accuracy at classifying network data as normal or
malicious, but they require the availability of fully labeled data. The recently developed ladder network, which
combines neural networks with unsupervised learning, shows promise in achieving a high accuracy while only
requiring a small number of labeled examples. We applied the ladder network to classifying network data
using the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition dataset (KDD
1999). Our experiments, show the ladder network was able to achieve similar results compared to supervised
classifiers while using a limited number of labeled samples.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Network security is essential to corporations as intrusions can result in massive
monetary losses. According to a report by the Ponemon Institute, which sampled
252 companies in 7 countries, the U.S. continues to rank highest in its cost of
cybercrime at an annual average of $15.4 million per company (Ponemon
Institute, 2015). Current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are either signature
based or anomaly based. Signature based detection methods require the attack to
be documented beforehand, thus new types of attacks that are not yet documented
cannot be detected. Anomaly based detection methods focus on finding unknown
or unusual activity patterns in the observed data (Holtsnider & Jaffe, 2010). They
allow new attacks to be discovered, however a domain expert is required to
analyze the anomalies.
Network data has been classified by a host of machine learning techniques.
Among the literature we reviewed included the work of Jadidi et al (2013), who
used Support Vector Machines (SVM) and flow based data sets to classify
network data as benign or malicious. Salama et al. (2011) have used a hybrid
intrusion detection scheme utilizing both Support Vector Machines and Deep
Belief Networks. Hasan and his colleagues have developed two IDS models: one
that uses SVMs and the other that uses the Random Forest Classifier (Hasan,
Nasser, Pal, & Ahmad, 2014). Haweliya and Nigam used a semi-supervised
Support Vector Machine (SVM) to classify an optimized version of the KDD
1999 dataset (Haweliya & Nigam, 2014).
Though supervised learning methods achieve high accuracy, they require fully
labeled data. Acquiring fully labeled data is a nontrivial task as labeling data
requires time and a human expert. Thus, learning from unlabeled data is more
desirable. Semi-supervised learning is learning with a small amount of labeled
data and a large amount of unlabeled data (Zien, Scholkopf, & Chapelle, 2006).
Recently, Rasmus et al. (2015) had shown that Ladder Networks, a semisupervised neural network scheme, are able to achieve a high classification rate
while using only a few labeled samples on the Mixed National Institute of
Standards and Technology (MNIST) dataset. In this paper, we use the Ladder
Networks to classify the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining Tools Competition dataset (KDD 1999). Three well studied, supervised
classifiers, a Deep Belief Network (DBN), a Support Vector Machine (SVM), and
a Random Forest were used to classify KDD 1999. These supervised results serve
as a baseline to compare with the Ladder Networks results.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background
on the classifiers: Support Vector Machine, Random Forest, Deep Belief Network
and Ladder Network. Section 3 describes our experiments and the results. Related
Work is discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Support Vector Machine
Support Vector machines are supervised learning models for classifying data. The
goal of a SVM is to find the optimum margin that maximizes the distance
between two target classes (Bishop, 2006; Schmidhuber, 2015; Hasan et al.,
2014). Essentially, a SVM tries to minimize the error of the distance between
each point in each class and a dividing line. This is done by finding the shortest
distance between two points in both classes. The line orthogonal to the shortest
distance line is the dividing line.

2.2 Random Forest
Random forests are an ensemble of classification or regression trees. The random
forest classifier works by partitioning the training set of the data into k subsets and
constructing a decision tree out of each subset. All of the subsets are created by
randomly selecting samples from the original set. Each decision tree is
independent of all other decision trees.
Each decision tree is made by randomly selecting m variables (features) out of
all the variables and finding the best split on the selected variables. The best split
is determined by the entropy or unpredictability of the variables. This is done at
each node and continued until a node cannot be split further, leading to the leaf
nodes. The testing data is then run through each tree and each tree provides a
classification. The classifications of all the trees are then taken into account and
the final classification of the forest is determined by the majority of the decision
trees (Breiman, 2001).
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2.3 Deep Belief Neural Network
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) aim to imitate the biological process of a path
of neurons being strengthened in the brain when a skill is learned. An ANN is
composed of an input layer which represents the features of the data. The input
layer is connected to one or more hidden layers where matrices of weighted
connections are used to map the input to the output layer, which consists of the
classes of the data. Essentially, a Neural Network learns by updating the matrices
of weights until it is able to achieve a high accuracy in mapping the input layer to
the output layer. A Deep Belief Neural Network (DBN) is a Neural Network with
multiple hidden layers. It can be viewed as a stack of restricted Boltzmann
machine (Hinton, 2009). Boltzmann machines are networks of neuron units that
are symmetrically connected. These neuron units make stochastic decisions
whether to be on or off (Hinton, 2007). A Boltzmann machine is restricted in that
there are no connections between neural units of the same layer (Hinton,
Osindero, & Teh, 2006).
The DBN learns iteratively by updating the weights through the backward
propagation algorithm. It works by calculating the net input for each neuron,
which is the sum of (inputs * weights) for each connection leading into that
neuron (Hecht-Nielsen, 1989). After that, the current output for each neuron is
calculated using a logistic function. Then the error is calculated for all neurons.
Finally, the error is fed back through the layers and the weights are updated to get
a better accuracy.

Figure 1. Ladder Network Architecture
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2.4 Ladder Networks
Ladder Networks can be seen as nested denoising Auto-Encoders (dAE) that
share lateral connections between the encoder and decoder at each layer. An autoencoder tries to learn a classifying function by mapping an input x to an output y.
This is prone to over-fitting, which is the classifier having learned the training
examples well, but cannot generalize to new data. To avoid over-fitting, noise is
introduced, specifically a corrupted version of x is created and the auto-encoder
tries to map it to the same y. With Ladder Networks, this happens at each layer,
latent variables (variables inferred from observed variables) are used in layers
beyond the input layer. Learning is based on minimizing the cost || (ẑ - z) ||2 where
z is the original latent variable and ẑ is the reconstruction of the corrupted version
of it. Each layer adds to a cost function for decoder d, Cd (l) = ||z(l) - ẑ(l) ||2 which
(l+1)
trains the layers to learn the denoising function ẑ(l) = g(l) (z(l)
̃ ,ẑ ) which maps
(l)
(l)
the corrupted z̃ onto the estimate without noise, ẑ . One of the parts
differentiating Ladder Networks from dAEs are skip connections between the
encoder and decoder at each layer that allow some of the details to be represented
by the lower layers and the higher ones. An illustration of the architecture of a 3
layer Ladder Network is shown in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, L =3. x → z(l) →z(2) →z(3) → y is the clean feedforward path, x →
(3)
(3)
(2)
(1)
z̃{(l)} → z(2)
̃ → z̃ → ỹ is the corrupted feedforward path, and ẑ → ẑ → ẑ
{(i)}
→ x̂ is the decoder. The decoder has denoising functions, g
, and cost
(l)
(l)
functions, Cd , that try to minimize the difference between ẑ and z(l) . See
Rasmus et al., (2015) for more information on Ladder Networks.

3. EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS
We analyzed the dataset used in the Third International Knowledge Discovery
and Data Mining Tools Competition (KDD 1999), held in conjunction with the
Fifth International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. The
raw training data contains about 4GB of compressed packet capture data from
seven weeks of network traffic. This data has been processed into approximately
4.9 million connection records, with a set of 41 features. These features describe
various aspects of a particular connection record, such as the service used,
protocol, source bytes, and destination bytes (Fiore, Palmieri, Castiglione, & De
Santis, 2013). Each sample is labeled as a normal or an abnormal connection. The
abnormal connections fall into four main categories with subcategories based on
the popular nomenclature of the specific attack at the time (e.g. Ping of Death)
(Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu, & Ghorbani, 2009). Table 1 describes both the categories
and subcategories of malicious connections found in the KDD 1999 dataset.
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2016/Practice/2

4

Nadeem et al.: Semi-Supervised Deep Neural Network for Network Intrusion Detecti

The Random Forest and SVM classifiers were implemented using sci-kit learn
(Pedregosa et al., 2011). For both classifiers data was cross-validated using K-fold
cross validation (Refaeilzadeh, Tang, & Liu, 2009). Ten folds were used with the
test evaluation at the final fold. The DBN was implemented using Theano and
Blocks (Theano Development Team, 2016; van Merrënboer et al., 2015). The
Ladder Network was implemented using Theano, Blocks and Fuel. Theano is a
Python library used in creating and solving mathematical expressions; Blocks
allows neural networks to be built on top of Theano; and Fuel provides the
datasets to be used in machine learning methods. In order to use the KDD 1999
dataset, the Fuel package for the Ladder Network had to be modified to allow for
pre-processing.
Major Categories

Sub-Categories

Denial of Service (DoS)

Ping of Death, LAND, Neptune,
Backscatter, Smurf, Teardrop

User to Root (U2R)

Buffer Overflow, Loadmodule, Perl,
Rootkit

Remote to Local (R2L)

FTP write, password guessing, IMAP
attacks, Multi-hop, PHF, Spy,
Warezclient, Warezmaster

Probing

Ipsweeping, Nmap, Portsweeping, Satan

Table 1. Categories of Malicious Behavior

3.1 Supervised Classification
A DBN, a Random Forest classifier, and a SVM classifier were used to analyze
the KDD dataset. For each classifier, four tests were run varying the number of
examples for each class. The tests were run requiring 10, 1000, 3000, and 5000
examples per class. They correspond to 16, 9, 6, and 6 classes respectively. These
classes include one normal class and the rest of the classes belong to
subcategories of attacks. Our experiments differ from Salama et al. (2011) in that
they used the four main categories for the abnormal classes. We decided to use
the subcategories in order to classify specific types of attacks. Two-thirds of the
data was randomly selected for training and the rest for testing. The classification
accuracy results are shown in Table 2. The time required for training and testing
combined is shown in Table 3.
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Examples

Accuracy %

# per class

# of classes

SVM

Random
Forest

DBN

10

16

42%

87%

90%

1000

9

76%

99%

95%

3000

6

98%

99%

98%

5000

6

97%

99%

98%

Table 2. Accuracy of SVM, Random Forest, and DBN classifiers on KDD 1999 data.

Execution Time (sec.)
Examples per
class

SVM

Random Forest

DBN

10

.014

1.832

13.2

1000

8.488

5.745

205.2

3000

14.01

8.717

399.6

5000

30.784

14.47

639.0

Table 3. Time needed for runs of supervised classifiers (in seconds)

The Random Forest classifier achieves a high accuracy on the second to fourth
tests and does so in the shortest time. The DBN has fairly high accuracy for each
test, when it is run for 1000 epochs with two hidden layers of 150 nodes each.
However, compared with the other two methods, the DBN takes the longest time.

3.2 Semi-Supervised Classification
Two experiments were performed using Ladder Networks to classify the KDD
1999 dataset. In the first experiment, four tests varying the number of examples
required for each class, i.e. 10, 1000, 2000, and 5000 were run. The training data
set includes both labeled and unlabeled examples. The ratio of labeled data is
50%. The classification accuracy, training and testing time are given in Table 4.
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Examples per
class

Accuracy

Training Time

Testing Time

10

N/A

N/A

N/A

1000

92.18%

12.4

0.3

3000

98.13%

21.5

0.3

5000

99.03%

21.8

0.4

Table 4. Accuracy, testing, and training time (minutes) required for Ladder Network

For the second experiment we used the dataset requiring 3000 examples in
each class and changed the number of labeled examples in different tests from 60,
600, 2400, 9600, and 12000. We keep the total number of data examples constant
at 18000, among which 12000 were used for training and the rest for testing. The
results are shown in Table 5.
# labeled

Percentage

Accuracy

Training

Testing

60

0.5%

97.35

26.1

0.3

600

5.0%

99.06

26.6

0.3

2400

20.%

98.78

26.6

0.3

9600

80.0%

99.2

27.0

0.3

12000

100%

99.18

27.0

0.3

Table 5. Results of Ladder Network with 3000 samples per class and varying the number
of labeled samples use, Training and Testing times in minutes. Percentage is from
training set.

The accuracy of the Ladder Networks increases as more examples are given
per class. However, it achieves a fairly high accuracy (97.35%) even with just 60
(0.5%) labeled examples, or 10 labeled examples per class. This is encouraging
since it is good accuracy with few labeled examples, which is desirable for real
world use. When using just 10 examples per class, a different architecture of the
Ladder Network is required. Therefore, the test with 10 examples per class was
not run.
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The iterative DBN and Ladder Network take the longest to achieve their
results. The Ladder Network was run for 50 epochs and it took 12.4 minutes for
1000 examples per class. The other Ladder Network tests took over 20 minutes.
Since retraining may take significant time, Ladder Networks may not be good for
real-time intrusion detection, but for forensic analysis, they may still be practical.

4. RELATED WORK
All of the supervised classifiers we have used have their own semi-supervised
versions. They have been used not for just intrusion detection, but also for image
classification. There is also another hybrid classifier with SVM and DBN (Salama
et al., 2011). In addition to different classifiers and different implementations of
those classifiers, there is also an alternative to the KDD 1999 dataset available:
the NSL-KDD dataset (Tavallaee et al., 2009).
Haweliya & Nigam (2014) used a semi-supervised SVM to classify the NSLKDD dataset. Their semi-supervised method consisted of self-training where the
SVM is trained on labeled data and then is used to classify unlabeled data which
is then used to further train the classifier as new labeled data. They also used
multiple training methods to compare and achieved 91.9% accuracy at their
highest. The problem with self-training is that incorrect classifications can
reinforce themselves. Our semi-supervised Ladder Network method does not use
questionable labels to train so the problem of self-training is prevented.
Jadidi et al. (2013) use S4VM to classify network data. S4VM improves upon
S3VM (the semi-supervised version of SVM) by creating diverse separators with
large margins and low densities. They use 10\% labeled examples and achieve an
accuracy as high as 93.76% on one of their datasets.
Our method achieved accuracy as high as 99% with a smaller percentage of
labeled data. However, for direct comparison, we need to run the Ladder Network
on their packet based datasets with the same percentage of labeled examples.
Tian & Gao (2009) used a Genetic Algorithm to optimize a Neural Network
and help the neural network avoid finding local minimums and help converge
faster. They used a small training set (100 examples) and achieved a low error
rate. Their dataset was similar to the KDD 1999 dataset. This work is related to
ours as it also achieves a low error while using a Neural Network to classify
intrusions.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, Ladder Networks, a semi-supervised approach, was used in
analyzing network data. To establish benchmarks, we used well-known, existing
supervised learning methods for Network intrusion detection to classify the KDD
1999 dataset: the Deep Belief Network, Support Vector Machine and Random
Forest. Two experiments using the Ladder Network were conducted. In the first
experiment, where the number of classes and examples per class were changed,
the semi-supervised Ladder Network was able to perform well at network data
classification in comparison to the supervised classifiers. In the second
experiment, where the number of labeled examples was changed, the Ladder
Network was able to maintain results above 90% with varying ratios of labeled
and unlabeled examples. In the near future, we would like to use the Ladder
Network on the NSL-KDD dataset and other, newer datasets. Other future work
includes exploring what other feed-forward neural network architectures could be
integrated with the Ladder Network structure to improve classification
performance.

6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We would like to thank Dr. Kaushik Roy, Dr. Albert Esterline, and Mr. William
Nick for their guidance and discussion.
This work is partially supported by the National Science Foundation under the
grant CNS-1460864. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

7. REFERENCES
Adankon, M. M. and Cheriet, M. (2010). Genetic algorithm-based training for semi-supervised
svm. Neural Computing & Applications, 19(8):1197--1206.
Alom, M. Z., Bontupalli, V., and Taha, T. M. Intrusion detection using deep belief networks. In
2015 National Aerospace and Electronics Conference (NAECON), pages 339--344.
Ashfaq, R. A. R., Wang, X.-Z., Huang, J. Z., Abbas, H., and He, Y.-L. (In Press). Fuzziness based
semi-supervised learning approach for intrusion detection system. Information Sciences.
Back, T., Hammel, U., and Schwefel, H. P. (1997). Evolutionary computation: comments on the
history and current state. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 1(1):3--17.

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2016

9

KSU Proceedings on Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice, Event 2 []
Bishop, C. M. (2006). Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning (Information Science and
Statistics). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., Secaucus, NJ, USA.
Breiman, L. (2001). Random forests. Machine Learning, 45(1):5--32.
Fiore, U., Palmieri, F., Castiglione, A., and De Santis, A. (2013). Network anomaly detection with
the restricted boltzmann machine. Neurocomputing, 122:13--23.
Hasan, M. A. M., Nasser, M., Pal, B., and Ahmad, S. (2014). Support vector machine and random
forest modeling for intrusion detection system (ids). Journal of Intelligent Learning
Systems and Applications, 6(1):45.
Haweliya, J. and Nigam, B. (2014a). Article: Network intrusion detection using semi supervised
support vector machine. International Journal of Computer Applications, 85(9):27--31.
Full text available.
Hecht-Nielsen, R. Theory of the backpropagation neural network. In Neural Networks, 1989.
IJCNN., International Joint Conference on, pages 593--605 vol.1.
Hinton, G. (2009). Deep belief networks. Scholarpedia, 4:5947.
Hinton, G. E., Osindero, S., and Teh, Y.-W. (2006). A fast learning algorithm for deep belief nets.
Neural Computation, 18(7):1527--1554.
Hinton, G. E. (2007). Boltzmann machine. 2(5):1668. revision #91075.
Holland, J. (2012). Genetic algorithms. Scholarpedia, 7:1482.
Holtsnider, B. and Jaffe, B. D. (2010). 7.3.3.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention. Elsevier.
Jadidi, Z., Muthukkumarasamy, V., Sithirasenan, E., and Sheikhan, M. (2013). Flow-based
anomaly detection using neural network optimized with gsa algorithm. In 2013 IEEE
33rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, pages 76-81.
Lin, L.-z., Liu, Z.-g., and Duan, X.-h. Network intrusion detection by a hybrid method of rough set
and rbf neural network. In 2010 2nd International Conference on Education Technology
and Computer, volume 3, pages V3--317--V3--320.
Pedregosa, F., Varoquaux, G., Gramfort, A., Michel, V., Thirion, B., Grisel, O., Blondel, M.,
Prettenhofer, P., Weiss, R., Dubourg, V., Vanderplas, J., Passos, A., Cournapeau, D.,
Brucher, M., Perrot, M., and Duchesnay, E. (2011). Scikit-learn: Machine learning in
Python. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 12:2825--2830.
Ponemon Institute (2015). 2015 cost of cybercrime report: United states. Hewlett Packard
Enterprise.
Rasmus, A., Valpola, H., Honkala, M., Berglund, M., Raiko, T., and th Annual Conference on
Neural Information Processing Systems, N. t. A. C. o. N. I. P. S. N. (2015). Semisupervised learning with Ladder Networks. Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, 2015-January:3546--3554.
Refaeilzadeh, P., Tang, L., and Liu, H. (2009). Cross-Validation, pages 532--538. Springer US,
Boston, MA.
Salama, M. A., Eid, H. F., Ramadan, R. A., Darwish, A., and Hassanien, A. E. (2011). Hybrid
Intelligent Intrusion Detection Scheme, pages 293--303. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Berlin, Heidelberg.

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2016/Practice/2

10

Nadeem et al.: Semi-Supervised Deep Neural Network for Network Intrusion Detecti
Schmidhuber, J. (2015). Deep learning in neural networks: An overview. Neural Networks, 61:85-117.
Tavallaee, M., Bagheri, E., Lu, W., and Ghorbani, A. A. A detailed analysis of the kdd cup 99 data
set. In 2009 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence for Security and Defense
Applications, pages 1--6.
Tian, J. and Gao, M. Network intrusion detection method based on high speed and precise genetic
algorithm neural network. In Networks Security, Wireless Communications and Trusted
Computing, 2009. NSWCTC '09. International Conference on, volume 2, pages 619-622.
Theano Development Team (2016). Theano: A Python framework for fast computation of
mathematical expressions. arXiv e-prints, abs/1605.02688.
Tesfahun, A. and Bhaskari, D. L. (2013). Intrusion detection using random forests classifier with
smote and feature reduction. In Cloud Ubiquitous Computing Emerging Technologies
(CUBE), 2013 International Conference on, pages 127--132.
Tsai, C.-F., Hsu, Y.-F., Lin, C.-Y., and Lin, W.-Y. (2009). Intrusion detection by machine
learning: A review. Expert Systems With Applications, 36(10):11994--12000.
van Merriënboer, B., Bahdanau, D., Dumoulin, V., Serdyuk, D., Warde-Farley, D., Chorowski, J.,
and Bengio, Y. (2015). Blocks and fuel: Frameworks for deep learning. CoRR,
abs/1506.00619.
Zien, A., SchoÌˆlkopf, B., and Chapelle, O. (2006). Semi-supervised Learning. Adaptive
Computation and Machine Learning. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
(1999). Kdd cup 1999 data. http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2016

11

